the economy is.
but not only the economy.
a campaign based on it alone is folly, but this requires some explanation.
economic voting theory relies on a fairly straightforward approach to rational social organization - in an election, voters are expected to legitimize their political representatives by asserting their self-interest (the economic sphere being primary). as a strictly modernist perspective, this does not really hold up to analysis: people do not necessarily choose based on long term interests, people are inadequately informed as to what economic policy entails, people often make selfless choices, and people do not necessarily make good choices.
though certainly the economy remains a frequent sticking point, it would be nonsensical to discard all other aspects of the campaign. beginning with reagan, we can see a sharp transition into a non-rational electoral strategy: image management and emotional appeal override the persuasive argument we might expect. thus, "morning in america" and "the bear in the woods" stand out in the history of successful campaign strategy, but entirely operate through the manipulation of emotion on a personal level. consider:
Morning in America:
The Bear:
these examples are pivotal, and yet entirely lacking substance. once in office, the reagan administration was quite famous for its control over communications - media access was strictly restricted to focus on the message of the day, with its planning contingent on a strong focus on public relations. the voter can not be expected to make an informed choice about anything given restricted access to information - in such circumstances, the economic voter is actually acting towards delegitimization of the administration.
similarly (and via the continued service of reagan-era consultants), we see the manipulation of dukakis' record as governor of massachusetts being performed by the bush campaign: stump speeches criticized dukakis for failing to clean the polluted boston harbor; for vetoing a state-level school pledge mandate; for allowing the willie horton furlough. rationally, we might consider that: such enduring pollution might be consequent to reagan administration EPA cuts; such pledge legislation was already ruled unconstitutional; the furlough system was developed under a republican administration. note that bush had no particular interest in reversing any of these policies: they served to provoke an emotional response. dukakis largely attempted to ignore what he felt to be nonsensical claims, and certainly did not counterattack with the same method, sticking instead to economic policy proposals.
the 1992 election is something of a wash due to the perot interception, but we can observe some interesting aspects. notably, bush's approach changed in this campaign, with the departure of ailes and atwater as consultants - essentially running on the expectation that people would reasonably choose to allow an incumbent to continue on the basis of previous successes. the clinton and perot campaigns, of course, were focused around economic issues, and might serve as an interesting watermark for such voter interests at around 60% of total popular support. contemporary polling also had around 60% of the population claiming "the economy" was the most important issue. at the same time, each campaign was not exactly diametrically opposed on economic policies (for example, one could select from a mixture of shared approaches to NAFTA, social spending, and deficit control between the three candidates). what does "the economy" entail? did anyone really vote against a particular economic approach in this election?
by 1996 we can observe two important trends in the rise of endless media coverage and the slickness of clinton's policy agenda. in short, we find the arrival of policy triangulation and the permanent campaign. clinton moved quickly to secure a position as a moderate by hijacking some aspects of policy where polling indicated advantage. whereas dole relied on experience and traditional values to justify broader campaign proposals, clinton moved to gain support through targeting various special interests, through metaphorical oration, and through casual exploitation of his personal charm. as noted, the importance of the permanent campaign arises when we consider the constant travel and policy advertisement that occured between elections - clinton was attempting to be everywhere and all things to all people.
the campaigns of bush v. gore sort of lack differentiation in this respect (they both tried to be centrists) and ended in a tie anyway. let's skip to bush v. kerry. by this point, we have a fairly well developed set of campaign practices: image control, personal emotional appeal and the permanent campaign are central. an interesting development arises from the combination of these factors: contextual truth. but this was neither trivial nor accidental. consider karl rove's remarks:
consequently, we find that the goal of the postmodern campaign is to:The aide said that guys like me were "in what we call the reality-based community," which he defined as people who "believe that solutions emerge from your judicious study of discernible reality." ... "That's not the way the world really works anymore," he continued. "We're an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you're studying that reality—judiciously, as you will—we'll act again, creating other new realities, which you can study too, and that's how things will sort out. We're history's actors…and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we do."
a) connect to the individual;
b) do so on a personal and emotional level;
c) do so via the ephemeral nature of media coverage and the social web;
d) manipulate the voter's interpretation of real events and circumstances via a,b,c.
thus, popular support is secured for the time being. one hopes that the correct side of this campaign cycle is on top on election day.
in 2008, both mccain and obama attempted to use these principles in their campaigns. we can see how criticism as a "celebrity president" arises from this style of politics, as the more traditional policy-based rationality is discarded in favor of, well, you all remember this part. institutionally, it might be instructive to look at obama's approach to the long tail of politics - via the mobilization of tens of thousands of interest groups at the smallest level (each driven by self-motivated integration), we find unveiled the stage on which the individual person forms their own personal attachment to the campaign.
from this approach, we can see that "key issues in this election" is not an objective category. what feels important to you today? how can this feeling be developed and exploited?
such is the realm of the postmodern campaign. only at some points, and for some people, will "the economy" be the answer. one could question rational policy consequences, but successful campaigns no longer operate with a focus on that goal.