2012 U.S. Presidential Election

[Dark Sage]

Hey, Roy...

Let's put this argument aside for a minute. I found an article about the ruling that's a real scream.

http://www.ijreview.com/2012/06/9398...ith-obamacare/

Apparently, this guy claims that Roberts did it on purpose to hurt Obama.

Amazing what some folks will believe.

[Roy Karrde]

Hey, Roy...

Let's put this argument aside for a minute. I found an article about the ruling that's a real scream.

http://www.ijreview.com/2012/06/9398...ith-obamacare/

Apparently, this guy claims that Roberts did it on purpose to hurt Obama.

Amazing what some folks will believe.

I gotta agree that is pretty pathetic, the only real theory right now that I can see that holds any credence is that Roberts originally was going to strike down Obamacare, but changed his mind at the last minute.

[Dark Sage]

My theory is, Roy, that Roberts sided with the moderates because the four dissenting Justices were being TOO conservative, and too unwilling to compromise. They wanted to kill the whole law, even the parts that they admitted were constitutional. The unrelenting nature of their views caused Roberts to side with the President.

That is only a theory on my part. We won't know the truth until the next tell-all book written about the Court is released.

[Roy Karrde]

My theory is, Roy, that Roberts sided with the moderates because the four dissenting Justices were being TOO conservative, and too unwilling to compromise. They wanted to kill the whole law, even the parts that they admitted were constitutional. The unrelenting nature of their views caused Roberts to side with the President.

That is only a theory on my part. We won't know the truth until the next tell-all book written about the Court is released.

Well the law should have been killed because there was no sever-ability clause, meaning if one part is unconstitutional, the entire thing is unconstitutional. There is nothing radical or moderate about that, it's the law.

But if you read the dissent by Justice Scalia, it refers to Justice Ginsburg as the dissent, suggesting that it was originally written as part of a majority opinion.

[Dark Sage]

More news...

In a move that is not surprising in the least, the Justice Department has announced that they will not be prosecuting their boss Eric Holder on the criminal contempt charge that the House voted to indict him on relating to the "Fast & Furious" investigation.

Which means, more or less, that the investigation will likely not go any further.

All-in-all, this has not been a very good week for the GOP.

[Gavin Luper]

Oh of course you are right, my sister has preexisting conditions and because of it for a time my parents had to forgo insurance to pay for insurance and her and the rest of us. Honestly when the economy gets this down, for alot of people there is a choice between insurance, or paying the water/electric or tax bill.

You just made a case for free universal health care, Roy, congratulations.

Seriously.

If that is a problem for poorer folk - choosing whether to pay health insurance or bills - make the health insurance, a basic form of it, free and universal, easing the pressure on these poor folk. Well-argued, sir, well-argued.

How about I propose a health care plan that the GOP is sure to love?

It's basically the same as Obama's plan, but we scrap the mandate. If someone doesn't want to buy insurance, he doesn't have to...

HOWEVER... If he doesn't, and he goes into an emergency room seeking treatment, they get to kick him out like any other deadbeat unless he provides proof that he can pay for it.

And it doesn't matter if he's bleeding from multiple stab wounds and used his last ounce of strength to crawl into the place. No way to pay, too bad.

I'm sure that the heartless leadership of the House would find that to their liking.

Does this actually happen in the US? Are people refused medical treatment because they don't have insurance?

Or, if they don't have it, are they simply forced to pay thousands upon thousands of dollars out of their own pocket?

[kurai]

The former clerk for Justice Roberts see's it quite differently and backs up the case that I, and Exile's dad has made.

"The key move in Roberts’ opinion is his conclusion that the individual mandate is actually a sort of tax, and therefore constitutional by virtue of Congress’s unquestioned power to tax. That allows the mandate to stand, yes — but effectively makes the mandate sui generis, and thereby denies the government a new source of regulatory power.

This is why: Roberts does not say that the government may now regulate anything it likes by calling the regulation a tax. He says this mandate can be read as a tax in these circumstances — that is, in light of the fact that it would be unconstitutional on any other ground and the court is supposed to avoid finding statutes unconstitutional if it can— and on these grounds: because it is administered by the IRS through the tax code and operates in many respects like a normal tax. Only if future regulatory schemes can meet all these criteria would they be valid under the taxing power"

http://dailycaller.com/2012/06/28/jo...sing-decision/

As I have said, the Justices laid out a way to make it constitutional, this effects this, and future regulation in showing that using the Commerce clause to try to push this type of regulation is unconstitutional. You can argue, but that does not make you any less wrong.

greetings,

i think you will find that your quoted section, the clerk primarily discusses the implications of the judgement on the taxing clause and not the commerce clause - the specific application of the mandate as examined provides the sui generis (unique) condition under the taxing power which fulfills constitutional validity.

the second section you highlight is exactly analogous to roberts' remarks in III-D, wherein "And it is only because we have a duty to construe a statute to save it", which is also mirrored in the minority dissent via "ut res magis valeat quam pereat". given that both of these are obiter, it is necessary to recognize that this is not actually binding.

most of the discussion about the "majority" decision on the subject of commerce is actually talking about this combination of roberts and the dissent, which is 5-4. but because this is obiter dicta, it does not define this use of the commerce clause as unconstitutional, it only points to the likelihood of such a definition in the event of a future case. this is important, but you can't skip that intermediate step in establishing an actual judgement of unconstitutionality, which was my objection at the very offset.

[Roy Karrde]

More news...

In a move that is not surprising in the least, the Justice Department has announced that they will not be prosecuting their boss Eric Holder on the criminal contempt charge that the House voted to indict him on relating to the "Fast & Furious" investigation.

Which means, more or less, that the investigation will likely not go any further.

All-in-all, this has not been a very good week for the GOP.

Umm no, the Republicans can now pursue a Civil Case in Court, which was expected all along to get the documents.

You just made a case for free universal health care, Roy, congratulations.

Seriously.

If that is a problem for poorer folk - choosing whether to pay health insurance or bills - make the health insurance, a basic form of it, free and universal, easing the pressure on these poor folk. Well-argued, sir, well-argued.

Except it is not free, it never have been free, it will never be free, there is no country in which it is free. You pay for it through taxes, you pay for it through limited resources, you pay for it through poorer treatment, you pay for it through poorer technology. And if the economy of your country collapses, you pay for it by having no health care at all.

Now do I think there should be safety nets? Do I think we should break up the monopolies per state? Of course, but that does not mean subjecting a country to universal health care and hurting the system.

Does this actually happen in the US? Are people refused medical treatment because they don't have insurance?

Or, if they don't have it, are they simply forced to pay thousands upon thousands of dollars out of their own pocket?

There are a variety of options in the U.S. from Medicaid which is Health Care for the poor, to hospitals and clinics providing free services such as Parkland in Dallas, to doctors providing payment plans.

greetings,

i think you will find that your quoted section, the clerk primarily discusses the implications of the judgement on the taxing clause and not the commerce clause - the specific application of the mandate as examined provides the sui generis (unique) condition under the taxing power which fulfills constitutional validity.

I would disagree, the entire argument in this case was that if the Commerce Cause was expanded to cover this, it would open up the ability to use it to "force people to buy broccoli" as the argument goes. As he said, this creates a unique condition through taxation, but as he also said, it denies the Government the power to use it to create new regulations through the Commerce Clause which was the fear and argument all along.

the second section you highlight is exactly analogous to roberts' remarks in III-D, wherein "And it is only because we have a duty to construe a statute to save it", which is also mirrored in the minority dissent via "ut res magis valeat quam pereat". given that both of these are obiter, it is necessary to recognize that this is not actually binding.

The clerk and law professor seems to indicate that these are binding, do you have any references of his level to say it is not?

most of the discussion about the "majority" decision on the subject of commerce is actually talking about this combination of roberts and the dissent, which is 5-4. but because this is obiter dicta, it does not define this use of the commerce clause as unconstitutional, it only points to the likelihood of such a definition in the event of a future case. this is important, but you can't skip that intermediate step in establishing an actual judgement of unconstitutionality, which was my objection at the very offset.

Right now we are going in circles, you have your beliefs I have mine, unless you have a outside source such as a law professor or clerk like I brought in and what Dark Sage brought in to back this up, the argument is pretty much over.

[Dark Sage]

Umm no, the Republicans can now pursue a Civil Case in Court, which was expected all along to get the documents.

But by the time that even starts, it may be time to start campaigning for 2016...

Face it, Roy, Issa has nothing, he'll never get anything, and this whole farce is just hurting the GOP.

[Roy Karrde]

But by the time that even starts, it may be time to start campaigning for 2016...

Oh no doubt but that did not stop the Democrats in 2007 from going after Bush's people.

Face it, Roy, Issa has nothing, he'll never get anything, and this whole farce is just hurting the GOP.

And, let me get this straight, why do you want Issa to have nothing? People died here, a U.S. Citizen died here, 300 plus Mexicans died here. This isn't some political back and forth, these are people's lives we are talking about. There is a point you put politics aside and just want the f'ing truth.

[kurai]

I would disagree, the entire argument in this case was that if the Commerce Cause was expanded to cover this, it would open up the ability to use it to "force people to buy broccoli" as the argument goes. As he said, this creates a unique condition through taxation, but as he also said, it denies the Government the power to use it to create new regulations through the Commerce Clause which was the fear and argument all along.

The clerk and law professor seems to indicate that these are binding, do you have any references of his level to say it is not?

Right now we are going in circles, you have your beliefs I have mine, unless you have a outside source such as a law professor or clerk like I brought in and what Dark Sage brought in to back this up, the argument is pretty much over.

the problem is that one must understand the distinction between obiter and ratio and how it relates to the application of judicial decisions. the clerk is making an argument for the necessity of the commerce definition in relation to the taxing power, but this is not binding in law at present, because no majority judgement to this effect exists (only an implicit majority agreement). the dark sage "law professor" source offers no elaboration on how it ought to be interpreted.

consider that what you are suggesting is that the dissent actually won - its opinion is entirely reliant on producing a restrictive definition of commerce clause powers (the majority judgement is not, it produces a definition of taxing power). but roberts did not sign that opinion: it is not the majority judgement, and there is no real way for it to act as binding precedent.

since you insist, here is a law professor and an attorney remarking as such:

Although a majority of the Supreme Court upheld the Affordable Care Act yesterday under the Tax and Spending Clause, five justices - Justice Roberts in obiter dictum and four other justices in dissent - expressed their opinion that the enforcement mechanism of individual mandate of the Affordable Care Act was unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause. In contrast, had Congress simply expanded Medicare to cover everybody it would have been perfectly constitutional under the Spending Clause. Think for a moment about what that means.

The only provisio to the general validity of PPACA is that the government’s ability and discretion to cut off state medicaid funds is to be interpreted as narrowly as possible, meaning that individual states can effectively opt out of the new coverage expansions mandated by PPACA. So extra medicaid funds are carrots, but not sticks. Since the law was generally upheld, the severability questions are moot. And interestingly, it appears that there are five votes for the idea that the mandate does exceed the Commerce power, but this is dicta, since the mandate is a valid exercise of the taxing power. I’ll have to muse on that further. Overall, a big win for the Administration, which had been bracing for a harder hit than this.

remember, obiter dictum is by definition not a binding rule of law! it literally means 'something said in passing'. it is important that 5 justices provided a similar opinion on the matter, but it has not been decided that this power is unconstitutional.

because this source is obiter, consider that if a similar case were to arise, and a lower court were to decide that compulsion of non-participants was a valid use of the commerce clause, it would not be ignoring binding precedent. they could either say:

a) we think this is a valid use, maybe the obiter in the PPACA case is not applicable to this case, feel free to take this to the supreme court and get them to actually offer a binding decision
b) the majority of scotus seems to think this is invalid, so we will cite obiter as our reason for judging against such power, feel free to take this to the supreme court and get them to actually offer a binding decision

however, if a lower court were to encounter another new case following the newly established taxing power doctrine (whether it is sui generis or not, as the clerk argues, a similar situation can be replicated), they would have to ignore the binding ratio found in PPACA in order to reject the new legislation. this would be a pretty radically activist position (it is ignoring a clear legal rule), and the decision would be overturned at a higher level - it would not make it to the roberts court, as it is unlikely to feel like overturning itself so soon.

but scotus absolutely would issue a clarifying ruling on the extent of the commerce clause, because no legal rule exists as to its application presently. only the implication that a majority of justices would rule in a particular way - this is the difference between obiter and ratio. it is important that this is enough to persuade the federal government to not try using commerce this way until the make-up of the court changes, but it does not bind lower courts to rule against such uses in any particular way. another decision is needed to provide an actual ruling that such an exercise of power is unconstitutional, as we only have obiter evidence at present.

[Dark Sage]

And, let me get this straight, why do you want Issa to have nothing? People died here, a U.S. Citizen died here, 300 plus Mexicans died here. This isn't some political back and forth, these are people's lives we are talking about. There is a point you put politics aside and just want the f'ing truth.

It would help if the guy running the "investigation" wasn't a car thief who respected Executive Privledge. A lot of people don't realize that the President has the right to do that, and he's far from the only one who has. Bush and Reagan both did it far more than Obama has.

[Dark Sage]

In fact, why don't you let me spell it out for you...

When Mr. Obama invoked Executive Privledge, that should have been the end of it. The House had NO right to hold Holder in contempt, and by doing so, they DEFIED Obama's Executive Privledge. If anyone committed a criminal action here, it's Issa.

"An American citizen and 300 Mexicans died because of this". That is a tragedy, but that oft-quoted statement would have more merit if Issa and the rest of the House GOP cared one bit about the victims. They... do... NOT. This whole thing is a political show meant to discredit the President and make him look bad, which ties into the overall GOP goal for the past three years: Make the President look bad so that he is voted out of office in 2012.

And the GOP House leadership fails to realize that by following this goal and wasting time and taxpayer money on projects that have no hope of reaching completion, their own approval rating is plummeting, and the public view of them is that of two-hundred drunken clowns with bees in their underpants.

The GOP and their supports are under the sad impression that Obama isn't a "real" President, and that's just horrible. I was no fan of G.W. Bush, but I never ONCE joined the popular misconception that he had stolen the election from Gore. Obama was duly elected into the office of President, and when he asserts the authority that is bestowed upon him by that office, Congress either likes it or lumps it!

If they don't like it, they can appoint a special prosecutor if they want... But given the $60 million failure that was the Starr Report, I wouldn't recommend it.

There, I said it. I feel better.

Edit: And one more thing...

If you were to study the Fast and Furious program, you'd learn that it was started in 2006. Obama wasn't even President then, and its failure was not Holder's fault.

[Roy Karrde]

Edit: And one more thing...

If you were to study the Fast and Furious program, you'd learn that it was started in 2006. Obama wasn't even President then, and its failure was not Holder's fault.

Actually that was a different program called Wide Reciever and unlike Fast and Furious it was done with the Mexican Government to track the weapons.

Now there are many things wrong with your rant but here is a major one.

First: Obama cannot claim executive privilege here. Because you cannot claim it in a criminal cover up, or the cover up of a crime, the documents being asked go into the period where the DOJ and Holder possibly lied to Congress, by trying to assert executive privilege Obama is trying to possibly cover up a crime, thus he has no ability to assert it. It comes from US v Espy.

“Moreover, the privilege disappears altogether when there is any reason to believe government misconduct occurred.” In Re: Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 746 (D.C. Cir. June 17, 1997, No. 96-3124).





Second: It is not the GOP who is playing politics here, this investigation has gone on for a year and a half. Of that time the DOJ has lied to Congress, dragged it's feat on producing documents until a subpoena was issued, refused to produce all the documents of the subpoena, and worse of all went after and attacked whistle blowers that gave information to Issa and Congress about wrong doing here. This isn't just political what the DOJ has done in the last year and a half, it is down right criminal, especially in their attack of whistle blowers.

"“We just learned that ATF senior management placed two of the main whistleblowers who have testified before Congress about Fast and Furious under the supervision of someone who vowed to retaliate against them,” they wrote before describing how senior political figures have made dangerous threats before.

Grassley and Issa said that in early 2011, right around the time Grassley first made public the whistleblowers’ allegations about Fast and Furious, Scot Thomasson – then the chief of the ATF’s Public Affairs Division – said, according to an eyewitness account: “We need to get whatever dirt we can on these guys [the whistleblowers] and take them down.”

Thomasson also allegedly said that: “All these whistleblowers have axes to grind. ATF needs to f—k these guys.”"

http://dailycaller.com/2012/06/29/is...#ixzz1zJ5pzzzX

[Dark Sage]

The Department of Justice clearly disagrees with you on all of those assumptions. The reason they refused to prosecute Holder was due to Mr. Obama's invoking of Executive Privledge.

And I still assert that Issa has no evidence of White House involvement, as he himself has admitted.

[Dark Sage]

By the way, Roy, do you know what scares me? Do you know what really scares me?

Among Romney supporters, YOU are the most lucid and rational one I know.

Take a look at this:

http://www.facebook.com/#!/pages/Nobama/183682808397145

If you'll read some of the responses to these articles on this page, you'll see what I mean. It's as if most of them had no education past the third grade. If this represents Romney's core support, he's in BIG trouble.

Oh, and if you happen to see a reponse from someone named Robert Corvello there... That's my dad... Look him up sometimes... He'd love to discuss this sort of thing with you.

But I warn you, he's much better at it than I am.

[Roy Karrde]

Oh I bet he is, and man all it takes is practice, if this were 6 years ago you would run rings around me, I promise.

As for the DOJ honestly I am not surprised they are not going to prosecute him, he is their boss, it would basically be the DOJ saying they believe their own boss is guilty. That is why it is going to a civil court.

[Leon-IH]

There are a variety of options in the U.S. from Medicaid which is Health Care for the poor, to hospitals and clinics providing free services such as Parkland in Dallas, to doctors providing payment plans.

So what you're saying is that you have a hideously disorganised and inefficient form of universal healthcare.

[Blademaster]

Basically, yeah. The Hippocratic Oath holds no power against the Almighty Dollar in this country.

[Gavin Luper]

Except it is not free, it never have been free, it will never be free, there is no country in which it is free. You pay for it through taxes, you pay for it through limited resources, you pay for it through poorer treatment, you pay for it through poorer technology. And if the economy of your country collapses, you pay for it by having no health care at all.

Now do I think there should be safety nets? Do I think we should break up the monopolies per state? Of course, but that does not mean subjecting a country to universal health care and hurting the system.

Are you for real? Of course it is paid for with taxes - but it's FREE for the individual using it. That's the whole point: that for those who are the most exposed and vulnerable (say, people who are recently unemployed, laid off, homeless, whatever) and who need medical care, there is something actually available to them free of charge. Those who are employed and affluent have the same option available to them, or they can opt for a higher level of private cover, which they would have to pay for themselves.

There would not be a situation where there is no health cover at all because the system single-handedly ruins the economy - I can't believe this is your argument.

As it is, I understand that people are forced to pay thousands upon thousands that they can't afford - leading to bankruptcy, poverty, crime and shonky dealings and loans - which is worse for the economy and the health system. If people didn't have this burden and had some basic universal safety net, the standard of living would improve along with it.

As far as I can see, you are arguing against this proposal because you fear that the wealthy will have to share the health system with the poor, or you fear that in allowing the poor access to the health care system, the standard of care for the wealthy would be diminished. That's the main concern you have, isn't it? Not that the far more numerous poor might actually get access to the care they need?

[mattbcl]

Gavin, the typical argument that I seem to hear from opponents of universal healthcare is less about the wealthy and the poor receiving the same standard of care, and more about abuse of the system. It goes something like this: "I don't want another tax on my hard-earned paycheck because some idiot halfway across the country decided to overdose on illegal drugs and get himself admitted to a hospital he can't possibly afford on his own. I don't want money taken away from me because some other idiot got himself fat off McDonald's fries and developed an overwhelming obesity problem that eventually led to his diabetic coma. I don't deserve to be punished for their stupid mistakes. The lives they lead aren't mine and I should only have to be held accountable for my own."

When the debate is framed like this, it's hard not to see the logic. But no matter what healthcare system we have, there's an inherent conceit happening here: we Americans feel entitled to do whatever we want with ourselves with flagrant and complete disregard for our own health, and then flee to the hospital expecting to be patched up good as new so we can continue our destructive habits. It's not a matter of whether we have universal health insurance or not, it's a matter of what the unwise ones are doing to make it harder for the rest of us.

Here's another conceit: we're assuming that those who take advantage of a universal healthcare system as a patch for unwise life choices are somehow going to vastly outnumber those who really, honestly, very much need it in order to survive. And you know what? Maybe it's true, maybe it ain't, but that's the risk you ought to be taking for your fellow man. I feel very disappointed to see that I have at least two acquaintances via Facebook who oppose this system, despite they themselves having had extensive life-saving medical procedures that their insurance could not possibly have covered on their own. It's like they forgot who wound up paying for the work in the end - 'cause these guys sure didn't have the money to do it. One's actively been making snide remarks about the whole business ever since the decision was passed down by SCOTUS. There's a mean streak in me that would like to remind him of his horrific car accident, his subsequent 3-month coma, the metal rod that is the structure of his leg, and his lack of olfactory sense... hey, bro, would you like to tell me exactly why my hard-earned money should have gone to cover SAVING YOUR LIFE? I think I've forgotten. You're alive, healthy, a productive member of our society, and you have the gall to complain that people around you shouldn't be privy to the standard of care you got because you don't think your generous paycheck can handle the stress. Man, go screw yourself.

Do I want to pay for someone else's mistakes? Well, no, if you're going to frame the question that way, I don't particularly WANT to. But there's more than just the mistakes we make with our own health, it's the mistakes others make that damage innocent people around them, people who deserve better (drunk driving victims spring to mind). And if the best way to ensure that those people are kept safe and healthy and productive is to take a little more money out of my pocket... as long as I have access to the same care, to SOME kind of care when it's my time to visit the emergency room... then I'll take it. Taxes are the price we pay to live in a civilized society.

[Gavin Luper]

Gavin, the typical argument that I seem to hear from opponents of universal healthcare is less about the wealthy and the poor receiving the same standard of care, and more about abuse of the system. It goes something like this: "I don't want another tax on my hard-earned paycheck because some idiot halfway across the country decided to overdose on illegal drugs and get himself admitted to a hospital he can't possibly afford on his own. I don't want money taken away from me because some other idiot got himself fat off McDonald's fries and developed an overwhelming obesity problem that eventually led to his diabetic coma. I don't deserve to be punished for their stupid mistakes. The lives they lead aren't mine and I should only have to be held accountable for my own."

When the debate is framed like this, it's hard not to see the logic. But no matter what healthcare system we have, there's an inherent conceit happening here: we Americans feel entitled to do whatever we want with ourselves with flagrant and complete disregard for our own health, and then flee to the hospital expecting to be patched up good as new so we can continue our destructive habits. It's not a matter of whether we have universal health insurance or not, it's a matter of what the unwise ones are doing to make it harder for the rest of us.

Here's another conceit: we're assuming that those who take advantage of a universal healthcare system as a patch for unwise life choices are somehow going to vastly outnumber those who really, honestly, very much need it in order to survive. And you know what? Maybe it's true, maybe it ain't, but that's the risk you ought to be taking for your fellow man. I feel very disappointed to see that I have at least two acquaintances via Facebook who oppose this system, despite they themselves having had extensive life-saving medical procedures that their insurance could not possibly have covered on their own. It's like they forgot who wound up paying for the work in the end - 'cause these guys sure didn't have the money to do it. One's actively been making snide remarks about the whole business ever since the decision was passed down by SCOTUS. There's a mean streak in me that would like to remind him of his horrific car accident, his subsequent 3-month coma, the metal rod that is the structure of his leg, and his lack of olfactory sense... hey, bro, would you like to tell me exactly why my hard-earned money should have gone to cover SAVING YOUR LIFE? I think I've forgotten. You're alive, healthy, a productive member of our society, and you have the gall to complain that people around you shouldn't be privy to the standard of care you got because you don't think your generous paycheck can handle the stress. Man, go screw yourself.

Do I want to pay for someone else's mistakes? Well, no, if you're going to frame the question that way, I don't particularly WANT to. But there's more than just the mistakes we make with our own health, it's the mistakes others make that damage innocent people around them, people who deserve better (drunk driving victims spring to mind). And if the best way to ensure that those people are kept safe and healthy and productive is to take a little more money out of my pocket... as long as I have access to the same care, to SOME kind of care when it's my time to visit the emergency room... then I'll take it. Taxes are the price we pay to live in a civilized society.

I've heard those kinds of arguments, too, Matt, and they are pretty abjectly selfish and inhumane, I reckon.

The health system shouldn't be some kind of judgment system "sorry, but you are an idiot, so we can't treat you". It's a system to protect all people, so it shouldn't be controversial that all people who work pay a small tax to ensure that basic level of cover and care for all citizens.

Don't get me wrong, I'd like to abolish taxes, but that's a utopian fantasy. As you say, taxes are an unavoidable part of the civilised world.

[MToolen]

Gavin, the typical argument that I seem to hear from opponents of universal healthcare is less about the wealthy and the poor receiving the same standard of care, and more about abuse of the system. It goes something like this: "I don't want another tax on my hard-earned paycheck because some idiot halfway across the country decided to overdose on illegal drugs and get himself admitted to a hospital he can't possibly afford on his own. I don't want money taken away from me because some other idiot got himself fat off McDonald's fries and developed an overwhelming obesity problem that eventually led to his diabetic coma. I don't deserve to be punished for their stupid mistakes. The lives they lead aren't mine and I should only have to be held accountable for my own."

I'm sure you're aware that people can and do abuse the system now in exactly that way, and people do pay for it already. Consider: you have a non-life-threatening injury, but lack insurance. You go to the emergency room, and pay a bit up-front as a measure of good faith. They give you meds and run tests, but then discharge you. Later, you get several bills similar in size to your life's savings, if not more. You inform the hospital of this, and (if lucky) they forgive the debt. But those doctors still need paid, so they get paid (and here's where my understanding wanes slightly) through some combination of government and insurance funds. More payment without recompense on the insurance company's part means they have to raise premiums. Raised premiums mean you cannot afford insurance for the next time it's needed.

My wife went through pretty much this exact scenario. While my wife and I are surviving on her income, we cannot afford health insurance for ourselves. With the passage of the PPACA, I can stay on my parents' health insurance for about three more years. My wife's family gets insurance from the military, which is managed through an entirely different set of laws, and so does not currently have health insurance. She had a series of pains in her abdomen caused by [too much information], went to our local ER, paid a bit up-front to get in, got meds and tests, and sent home the next day without a clue what was wrong. Later, we received bills from the hospital that we petitioned against and were released from.

The way I see it, more people on healthcare should mean cheaper healthcare premiums (yes, I do see the big fat "should"). This, in turn, would mean more people are able to afford health insurance, etc. I hope that the implementation of this system would mean people who have insurance would pay less and people who can't currently afford it would be able to. Is it going to be messy? Of course. Could it work? I think so.

[Roy Karrde]

Are you for real? Of course it is paid for with taxes - but it's FREE for the individual using it. That's the whole point: that for those who are the most exposed and vulnerable (say, people who are recently unemployed, laid off, homeless, whatever) and who need medical care, there is something actually available to them free of charge. Those who are employed and affluent have the same option available to them, or they can opt for a higher level of private cover, which they would have to pay for themselves.

Again you are not getting my point, if you are paying for it in taxes it is not free, you are just shifting the cost from paying for it through the insurance every month, to paying for it through the government every month.

There would not be a situation where there is no health cover at all because the system single-handedly ruins the economy - I can't believe this is your argument.

I am not saying it single-handedly ruins the economy, although it could contribute to it. I am saying that when you have a health care system completely reliant on the Government, if the Government gets in trouble, as we are seeing in Greece. The health care system fails completely. If you want further proof I would suggest reading this.

http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp...2b9df19d45.2b1

As far as I can see, you are arguing against this proposal because you fear that the wealthy will have to share the health system with the poor, or you fear that in allowing the poor access to the health care system, the standard of care for the wealthy would be diminished. That's the main concern you have, isn't it? Not that the far more numerous poor might actually get access to the care they need?

I could care less for what the wealthy get, I am worried about the standard of care for the middle class and elderly as it begins to diminish as the abuse of the system rises. Health Care is not a infinite resource, it is a finite one that when abused can lead to massive trouble ( The Parkland Hospital example I gave ). To make this a Wealthy vs Poor thing ignores the fact that the Wealthy and Middle Class and a significant amount of the Poor already share a high standard of care, one that would diminish if a Universal System was introduced such as Medicare.

[ChobiChibi]

I could care less

Once again your poor grammar lets you down

Because David Mitchell is always right.

To summarise, you do care, because you could care less than you currently do. However, if you couldn't care less, then you are at the lowest point of caring and therefore cannot care any less than you currently do.

[Roy Karrde]

Blade... you've changed xDD

I kid I kid, I can never get that right, thank's Chibi ^^;;

[kurai]

The health system shouldn't be some kind of judgment system "sorry, but you are an idiot, so we can't treat you". It's a system to protect all people, so it shouldn't be controversial that all people who work pay a small tax to ensure that basic level of cover and care for all citizens.

there are three policy-shaping questions which arise from this argument: what is it that such policy is protecting, which part of society have we determined needs this protection, and what sort of ideology drives its actual implementation? the replies are contingent on ideology and history, rather than objective criteria. it is not immediately obvious that, for example, a universal deployment of state-funded public hospitals would serve the desired goals of the politically-driven social policy agenda.

consider the following, from esping-anderson's eminent analysis in "the three political economies of the welfare state":

As commodities in the market, workers depend for their welfare entirely on the cash-nexus. The question of social rights is thus one of de-commodification, that is of granting alternative means of welfare to that of the market. De-commodification may refer either to the service rendered, or to the status of a person, but in both cases it signifies the degree to which distribution is detached from the market mechanism. This means that the mere presence of social assistance or insurance may not necessarily bring about significant de-commodification if they do not substantially emancipate individuals from market dependence. Means-tested poor relief will possibly offer a security blanket of last resort. But if benefits are low and attached with social stigma, the relief system will compel all but the most desperate to participate in the market. This was precisely the intent of the 19th Century poor laws. Similarly, most of the early social insurance programs were deliberately designed to maximize labor market performance (Ogus, 1979). Benefits required long contribution periods and were tailored to prior work effort. In either case, the motive was to avert work-disincentive effects.

There is no doubt that de-commodification has been a hugely contested issue in welfare state development. For labor, it has always been a priority. When workers are completely market dependent, they are difficult to mobilize for solidaristic action. Since their resources mirror market inequalities, divisions emerge between the 'ins' and the 'outs,' making labor movement formation difficult. De-commodification strengthens the worker and weakens the absolute authority of the employer. It is for exactly this reason that employers always opposed de-commodification.

De-commodified rights are differentially developed in contemporary welfare states. In social assistance dominated welfare states rights are not so much attached to work performance as to demonstrable need. Needs-tests and typically meagre benefits, however, serve to curtail the de-commodifying effect. Thus, in nations where this model is dominant (mainly in the Anglo-Saxon countries), the result is actually to strengthen the market since all but those who fail in the market will be encouraged to contract private sector welfare.

A second dominant model espouses compulsory state social insurance with fairly strong entitlements. Yet, again, this may not automatically secure substantial de-commodification, since this hinges very much on the fabric of eligibility and benefit rules. Germany was the pioneer of social insurance, but over most of the century can hardly be said to have brought about much in the way of de-commodification through its social programs. Benefits have depended almost entirely on contributions and, thus, work and employment. In fact, before the Second World War, average pensions in the German insurance system for workers were lower than prevailing poverty assistance rates (Myles, 1984). The consequence, as with the social assistance model, was that most workers would chose to remain at work rather than retire. In other words, it is not the mere presence of a social right, but the corresponding rules and preconditions that dictate the extent to which welfare programs offer genuine alternatives to market dependence.

The third dominant model of welfare, namely the Beveridge-type citizens benefit, may, at first glance, appear the most de-commodifying. It offers a basic, equal benefit to all irrespective of prior earnings, contributions or performance. It may indeed be a more solidaristic system, but not necessarily de-commodifying since, only rarely, have such schemes been able to offer benefits of such a standard that they provide recipients with a genuine option to that of working.

De-commodifying welfare states are, in practice, of very recent date. A minimalist definition must entail that citizens can freely, and without potential losses of job, income or general welfare, opt out of work under conditions when they, themselves, consider it necessary for reasons of health, family, age or even educational self-improvement; when, in short, they deem it necessary for participating adequately in the social community.

...

Welfare states vary considerably with respect to their principles of rights and stratification. This results in qualitatively different arrangements between state, market and the family. The welfare state variations we find, are therefore not linearly distributed, but clustered by regime-types.

In one cluster, we find the 'liberal' welfare state, in which means-tested assistance, modest universal transfers, or modest social insurance plans predominate. These cater mainly to a clientele of low income, usually working class, state dependents. It is a model in which, implicitly or explicitly, the progress of social reform has been severely circumscribed by traditional, liberal work-ethic norms; one where the limits of welfare equal the marginal propensity to demand welfare instead of work. Entitlement rules are therefore strict and often associated with stigma; benefits are typically modest. In turn, the state encourages the market, either passively by guaranteeing only a minimum, or actively by subsidizing private welfare schemes.

The consequence is that this welfare state regime minimizes de-commodification-effects, effectively contains the realm of social rights, and erects a stratification order that blends a relative equality of poverty among state welfare recipients, market-differentiated welfare among the majorities, and a class-political dualism between the two. The archetypical examples of this model are the United States, Canada, and Australia. Nations that approximate the model are Denmark, Switzerland, and Great Britain.

A second regime-cluster is composed of nations such as Austria, France, Germany and Italy. Here, the historical corporatist-statist legacy was upgraded to cater to the new 'post-industrial' class structure. In these 'corporatist' welfare states, the liberal obsession with market efficiency and commodification was never pre-eminent and, as such, the granting of social rights was hardly ever a seriously contested issue. What predominated was the preservation of status differentials; rights, therefore, were attached to class and status. This corporativism was subsumed under a state edifice perfectly ready to displace the market as a provider of welfare; hence, private insurance and occupational fringe benefits play a truly marginal role in this model. On the other hand, the state's emphasis on upholding status differences means that its redistributive effects are negligible.

But, the corporativist regimes are also typically shaped by the Church, and therefore influenced by a strong commitment to the preservation of traditional family patterns. Social insurance typically excludes non-working wives, and family benefits encourage motherhood. Day care, and similar family services, are conspiciously underdeveloped, and the 'subsidiarity principle' serves to emphasize that the state will only interfere when the family's capacity to service its members is exhausted. An illustrative example is German unemployment assistance. Once a person has exhausted his/her entitlement to normal unemployment insurance, eligibility for continued assistance depends on whether one's family commands the financial capacity to aid the unfortunate; this obtains for persons of any age.

The third, and clearly smallest, regime-cluster is composed of those countries in which the principles of universalism and de-commodifying social rights were extended also to the new middle classes. We may call it the 'social democratic' regime-type since, in these nations, social democracy clearly was the dominant force behind social reform. Norway and Sweden are the clearest cases, but we should also consider Denmark and Finland. Rather than tolerate a dualism between state and market, between working class and middle class, the social democrats pursued a welfare state that would promote an equality of the highest standards, rather than an equality of minimal needs as was pursued elsewhere. This implied, first, that services and benefits be upgraded to levels commensurable to even the most discriminate tastes of the new middle classes; and, secondly, that equality be furnished by guaranteeing workers full participation in the quality of rights enjoyed by the better off.

This formula translates into a mix of highly de-commodifying and universalistic programs that, nonetheless, are tailored to differentiated expectations. Thus, manual workers come to enjoy rights identical to those of salaried white collar employees or civil servants; all strata and classes are incorporated under one universal insurance system; yet, benefits are graduated according to accustomed earnings. This model crowds out the market and, consequently, inculcates an essentially universal solidarity behind the welfare state. All benefit, all are dependent, and all will presumably feel obliged to pay.

The social democratic regime's policy of emancipation addresses both the market and the traditional family. In contrast to the corporatist-subsidiarity model, the principle is not to wait until the family's capacity to aid is exhausted, but to pre-emptively socialize the costs of familihood. The ideal is not to maximize dependence on the family, but capacities for individual independence. In this sense, the model is a peculiar fusion of liberalism and socialism. The result is a welfare state that grants transfers directly to the children, and takes direct caring responsibilities for children, the aged and the helpless. It is, accordingly, committed to a heavy social service burden, not only to service family needs, but also to permit women to chose work rather than the household.

Perhaps the most salient characteristic of the social democratic regime is its fusion of welfare and work. It is, at once, a welfare state genuinly committed to a full employment guarantee, and a welfare state entirely dependent on its attainment. On the one side, it is a model in which the right to work has equal status to the right of income protection. On the other side, the enormous costs of maintaining a solidaristic, universalistic and de-commodifying welfare system means that it must minimize social problems and maximize revenue income. This is obviously best done with most people working, and the fewest possible living off social transfers.

While it is empirically clear that welfare states cluster, we must recognize that no single case is pure. The social democratic regimes of Scandinavia blend crucial socialist and liberal elements. The Danish and Swedish unemployment insurance schemes, for example, are still essentially voluntarist. Denmark's labor movement has been chronically incapable of pursuing full employment policies due in part to trade union resistance to active manpower policies. And in both Denmark and Finland, the market has been allowed to play a decisive role in pensions.

Neither are the liberal regimes pure. The American social security system is redistributive, compulsory and far from actuarial. At least in its early formulation, the New Deal was as social democratic as was contemporary Scandinavian social democracy. In contrast, the Australian welfare state would appear exceedingly close to the bourgeois-liberal ideal-type, but much of its edifice has been the co-responsibility of Australian labor. And, finally, the European corporatist regimes have received both liberal and social democratic impulses. Social insurance schemes have been substantially destratified and unified in Austria, Germany, France and Italy. Their extremely corporativist character has thus been reduced.

Notwithstanding the lack of purity, if our essential criteria for defining welfare states have to do with the quality of social rights, social stratification, and the relationship between state, market and family, the World is composed of distinct regime-clusters. Comparing welfare states on scales of more or less or, indeed, better or worse, will yield highly misleading results.

...

If welfare states cluster into three distinct regime types, we are confronted with a substantially more complex task of identifying the causes of welfare state differences. What is the explanatory power of industrialization, economic growth, capitalism, or working class political power in accounting for regime types? A first superficial answer would be: very little. The nations we study are all more or less similar with regard to all but the working class mobilization variable. And we find very powerful labor movements and parties in each of the three clusters. A theory of welfare state developments must clearly reconsider its causal assumptions if we wish to explain clusters. The hope to find one single powerful causal motor must be abandoned; the task is to identify salient interaction effects. Based on the preceding arguments, three factors in particular should be of importance: the nature of (especially working-) class mobilization; class-political coalition structures; and the historical legacy of regime institutionalization.

As we have noted, there is absolutely no compelling reason to believe that workers will automatically and naturally forge a socialist class identity; nor is it plausible that their mobilization will look especially Swedish. The actual historical formation of working class collectivities will diverge, and so also will their aims and political capacities. Fundamental differences appear both in trade unionism and party development. A key element in trade unionism is the mix of craft and industrial unions. The former is prone to particularism and corporativism; the latter is inclined to articulate broader, more universal objectives. This blend decisively affects the scope for labor party action and also the nature of political demands. Thus, the dominance of the AFL in pre-war United States was a major impediment to social policy development. Likewise, the heavily craft-oriented Danish labor movement, compared to its Norwegian and Swedish counterparts, blocked social democracy's aspirations for an active labor market policy for full employment. In the United States, craft unions believed that negotiating occupational benefits was a superior strategy, given their privileged market position. In Denmark, craft unions jealously guarded their monopoly on training and labor mobility. Conversely, centralized industrial unionism will tend to present a more unified and consolidated working class clientele to the labor party, making policy consensus easier, and power mobilization more effective. It is clear that a working class mobilization thesis must pay attention to union structure.

Equally decisive is political or denominational union fragmentation. In many nations, for example Finland, France and Italy, trade unions are divided between socialist and communist parties; white collar unions are politically unaffiliated or divide their affiliation among several parties. Denominational trade unionism has been a powerful feature in Holland, Italy and other nations. Since trade unionism is such a centrally important basis for party mobilization, such fragmentation will weaken the left and thus benefit the non-socialist parties' chances of power. In addition, fragmentation may entail that welfare state demands will be directed to many parties at once. The result may be less party conflict over social policy, but it may also mean a plurality of competing welfare state principles. For example, the subsidiarity principle of Christian workers will conflict with the socialists' concern for the emancipation of women.

The structure of trade unionism may, or may not, be reflected in labor party formation. But, under what conditions are we likely to expect certain welfare state outcomes from specific party configurations? There are many factors that conspire to make it virtually impossible to assume that any labor, or left, party will ever be capable, single-handedly, of structuring a welfare state. Denominational or other divisions aside, it will be only under extraordinary historical circumstances that a labor party alone will command a parliamentary majority long enough to impose its will. We have noted that the traditional working class has, nowhere, ever been an electoral majority. It follows that a theory of class mobilization must look beyond the major leftist party. It is an historical fact that welfare state construction has depended on political coalition building. The structure of class coalitions is much more decisive than are the power resources of any single class.

The emergence of alternative class coalitions is, in part, determined by class formation. In the earlier phases of industrialization, the rural classes usually constituted the single largest electorate. If social democrats wanted political majorities, it was here that they were forced to look for allies. Therefore, it was ironically the rural economy that was decisive for the future of socialism. Where the rural economy was dominated by small, capital intensive family farmers, the potential for an alliance was greater than where it rested on large pools of cheap labor. And, where farmers were politically articulate and well-organized (as in Scandinavia), the capacity to negotiate political deals was vastly superior.

The role of the farmers in coalition formation and, hence, in welfare state development is clear. In the Nordic countries, the conditions obtained for a broad red-green alliance for a full-employment welfare state in return for farm price subsidies. This was especially true in Norway and Sweden, where farming was highly precarious and dependent on state aid. In the United States, the New Deal was premised on a similar coalition (forged by the Democratic party) but with the important difference that the labor intensive South blocked a truly universalistic social security system, and opposed further welfare state developments. In contrast, the rural economy of Continental Europe was very inhospitable to red-green coalitions. Often, as in Germany and Italy, much of agriculture was labor intensive and labor unions and left parties were seen as a threat. In addition, the conservative forces on the continent had succeeded in incorporating farmers into 'reactionary' alliances, helping to consolidate the political isolation of labor.

Political dominance was, until after World War II, largely a question of rural class politics. The construction of welfare states in this period was, therefore, dictated by which force captured the farmers. The absence of a red-green alliance does not necessarily imply that no welfare state reforms were possible. On the contrary, it implies which political force came to dominate their design. Great Britain is an exception to this general rule, because the political significance of the rural classes eroded before the turn of the century. In this way, Britain's coalition logic showed at an early date the dilemma that faced most other nations later, namely that the new white collar middle classes constitute the linchpin for political majorities. The consolidation of welfare states after World War It came to depend fundamentally on the political alliances of the new middle classes. For social democracy, the challenge was to synthesize working class- and white collar demands without sacrificing the commitment to solidarity.

Since the new middle classes have, historically, enjoyed a relatively privileged position in the market, they have also been quite successful in meeting their welfare demands outside the state or, as civil servants, by privileged state welfare. Their employment security has traditionally been such that full employment has been a peripheral concern. Finally, any program for drastic income equalization is likely to be met with great hostility among a middle class clientele. On these grounds, it would appear that the rise of the new middle classes would abort the social democratic project and strengthen a liberal welfare state formula.

The political position of the new middle classes has, indeed, been decisive for welfare state consolidation. Their role in shaping the three welfare state regimes described earlier is clear. The Scandinavian model relied almost entirely on social democracy's capacity to incorporate them in a new kind of welfare state: one that provided benefits tailored to the tastes and expectations of the middle classes, but nonetheless retained universalism of rights. Indeed, by expanding social services and public employment, the welfare state participated directly in manufacturing a middle class instrumentally devoted to social democracy.

In contrast, the Anglo-Saxon nations retained the residual welfare state model precisely because the new middle classes were not wooed from the market into the state. In class terms, the consequence is dualism. The welfare state caters essentially to the working class, and to the poor. Private insurance and occupational fringe benefits cater to the middle classes. Given the electoral importance of the latter, it is quite logical that further extensions of welfare state activities are resisted. Indeed, the most powerful thrust in these countries is an accent on fiscal welfare; i.e., on tax expenditures and deductions for private sector welfare plans.

The third, Continental European, welfare state regime has also been patterned by the new middle classes, but in a different way. The cause is historical. Developed by conservative political forces, these regimes institutionalized a middle class loyalty to the preservation of both occupationally segregated social insurance programs and, ultimately, to the political forces that brought them into being. Adenauer's great pension reform in 1957 was explicitly designed to resurrect middle class loyalties.

[it is important to note that 'corporatism' in the above section refers to units of negotiating power rather than corporations, and 'liberal' refers to the classical definition]

thus, to reflect on this article with respect to american health care policy, we are able to answer our opening three concerns.

since the united states operates near to the ideal-type of the liberal policy regime, we should consider the consequences developing out of its its historical implementations of social policy. we see a clear line of inheritance, oriented initially towards self-determination and charity otherwise, through means-tested programs rather than universal or corporatist claims.

this was arrived at through a two-step process: firstly, the westward colonization of the continent involved a long period in which there was a substantial emphasis on making one's own way and being responsible for the entirety of one's health and well-being. secondly, as cited above, the more recent growth of the middle class alongside the democratization of policy placed strong emphasis on the ability for its individual members to negotiate their own successes through the market.

these elements are strongly influential on present-day ideology and therefore also shape the available social policy options. how do we arrive at the PPACA? consider that it maintains the commodification of labor in addition to the commodification of the health care system as a whole - outcomes are tied directly to market capacity and participation, with a means-tested charitable supplement in addition to this. it is curious that this situation of apparently mandatory charity has been developed, but we can consider the cultural influence of universal systems elsewhere as a mediating force against the rolling out a purely market-oriented health care system (and additionally, legitimized by the christian-charity hospitals and clinics of the colonial past).

in sum: what is being protected? marketized health care; which part of society is being protected? the "middle class", with feel-good subsidy for the rest; which ideology drives this? that of a post-colonial liberal democracy. concerns of universal decommodification are not particularly relevant to american social policy at this point in history - the goal is to get as many people as possible to become reliant on the private insurance market, thus achieving a universal commodification that operates in accord with mainstream political ideology.

[Blademaster]

Kurai you are probably one of the most intelligent debaters here.

...Why do you never capitalize anything? It's like the one chink in an otherwise perfect suit of armor.

[Dark Sage]

I have something to say to all members of the GOP who claim that the Health Care Mandate is a "tax" and not a "penalty":

The British made clear that the Tea Tax was an "import fee".

Let's get serious, people. You can say I ate six donuts, or you can say I ate half a dozen. It's two ways of saying the exact same thing. That's the case here. The GOP seems to have a dim opinion of people's intelligence.

[Roy Karrde]

I have something to say to all members of the GOP who claim that the Health Care Mandate is a "tax" and not a "penalty":

The British made clear that the Tea Tax was an "import fee".

Let's get serious, people. You can say I ate six donuts, or you can say I ate half a dozen. It's two ways of saying the exact same thing. That's the case here. The GOP seems to have a dim opinion of people's intelligence.

No people's intelligence in politics is always dim, it is why politicians work in sound bites and not thoughtful long form debates. It's why debates now are more Q and A's instead of 3 hour functions where people can explain their positions and debate the opponents. And it's why we have a newscast boiled down to 30 minutes including the cute pet of the day, and the sports oddity of the day.

You say penalty and people don't care, you say tax, and suddenly people care as tax is something that effects all of us. Either way if the Dems do not like it being called a tax, don't get angry at the GOP, get angry at the Supreme Court.

And really seeing how Obama's false argument right now is that Romney engaged in sending American jobs over seas at Bain, I wouldn't really be bitching about the GOP taking a dim opinion of people's intelligence.

[Dark Sage]

Say what you will, Roy, but Romney's insistance that it's a tax is not convincing anyone who wasn't opposed to the bill from the start. In fact, support for Obamacare has grown since the ruling.

And Romney's insistance that it's a tax while the fee imposed by his plan was a penalty is hurting him too. The Wall Street Journal today called him "dumb". (And that's a direct quote.)

[Roy Karrde]

Say what you will, Roy, but Romney's insistance that it's a tax is not convincing anyone who wasn't opposed to the bill from the start. In fact, support for Obamacare has grown since the ruling.

And Romney's insistance that it's a tax while the fee imposed by his plan was a penalty is hurting him too. The Wall Street Journal today called him "dumb". (And that's a direct quote.)

Romney is not insisting it is a tax, he is saying and I quote: "Well, the Supreme Court has the final word. And their final word is that Obamacare is a tax. So it's a tax. They decided it was constitutional. So it is a tax and it's constitutional. That's the final word. That's what it is."

http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-18563_16...date-position/

He is just noting that it is the Supreme Court's final word, to say it is not a tax goes against the very Supreme Court ruling that upheld it.

[Dark Sage]

Romney is not insisting it is a tax, he is saying and I quote: "Well, the Supreme Court has the final word. And their final word is that Obamacare is a tax. So it's a tax. They decided it was constitutional. So it is a tax and it's constitutional. That's the final word. That's what it is."

http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-18563_16...date-position/

He is just noting that it is the Supreme Court's final word, to say it is not a tax goes against the very Supreme Court ruling that upheld it.

And despite being called a liar, Obama is insisting, as he did today, that if it is indeed a tax, he never gave his approval for it to be one.

I defy anyone to accuse that statement of being untruthful.

[Roy Karrde]

And despite being called a liar, Obama is insisting, as he did today, that if it is indeed a tax, he never gave his approval for it to be one.

I defy anyone to accuse that statement of being untruthful.

Then why did he not order his own lawyers to correct it when they insisted in front of the Supreme Court that it was a tax? Or in the brief they submitted to the Supreme Court?

http://washingtonexaminer.com/obama-...rticle/2501375

Either he is lying, or he is so incompitant that he did not know of his administration's own argument.

[Dark Sage]

Roy, stop posing your dumb links, because I don't read them. They always take me to conservative editorials.

[Roy Karrde]

Roy, stop posing your dumb links, because I don't read them. They always take me to conservative editorials.

Fine here is the Supreme Court Brief, I direct you to page 52 ( Page 69 in the PDF ).

http://www.justice.gov/osg/briefs/20...398.mer.aa.pdf

"“In passing on the constitutionality of a tax law,” a court is “concerned only with its practical operation, not its definition or the precise form of descriptive words which may be applied to it.” The practical operation of the minimum coverage provision is as a tax law. It is fully integrated into the tax system, will raise substantial revenue, and triggers only tax consequences for non-compliance…The Court has never held that a revenue-raising provision bearing so many indicia of taxation was beyond Congress’s taxing power, and it should not do so here."

Here is the audio of Obama's lawyer saying quite clearly "Pay the Tax"

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HF9Emyb4ejI

Neither is a editorial, both come straight from the White House's lawyers.

[Blademaster]

incompitant

I'm just gonna call irony on that one.

[Dark Sage]

Call it a tax, call it a penalty, it's the same thing in the end if you don't obey the mandate.

No matter how you serve a turkey, it remains a turkey.

[Roy Karrde]

Well there might be one difference other than the obvious sound bites. If the Republicans get to 50 seats in the Senate, hold onto the House, and have Romney as President. They can strike down Obamacare through Reconciliation now. Meaning there will be no chance for it to be filibustered, all because making the penalty a tax turns it into a budget measure.

[Dark Sage]

Well there might be one difference other than the obvious sound bites. If the Republicans get to 50 seats in the Senate, hold onto the House, and have Romney as President. They can strike down Obamacare through Reconciliation now. Meaning there will be no chance for it to be filibustered, all because making the penalty a tax turns it into a budget measure.

All very big "ifs". Romney's attitude now is quickly reminding me why he didn't make the nomination last time.

Let's just say I'm really looking forward to the debates.